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False Latching

The first major flaw in the RCF-65, 67/Type I buckle arises from the very design of the buckle itself. The user may, upon some occasions, insert the tongue into the buckle until enough resistence is encountered to lead him or her to believe the buckle is fully engaged, when in fact it is not. The RCF-65 and 67 have no spring or other eject feature built into the buckle to spit the tongue out if it was not fully engaged. The belt occupant in such circumstance is therefore led to believe that the buckle is engaged when it actually is not. If an accident occurs when the buckle is so configured, the sudden load forces cause the tongue to come out of the buckle and leave the occupant suddenly and unexpectedly unrestrained.

This condition, known as "false latching," has been a known drawback of the RCF-65 and -67 since its inception. As early as August 31, 1966 (prior to passage of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966) the National Bureau of Standards modified certain regulations governing seat belt buckles so as to include "additional requirements for buckles [which] are included to reduce the probability of false latching."

As early as 1970, the European community adopted regulations which prohibited the use of buckles in Europe in which false latching was possible. By 1974, the RCF-67 was illegal in Europe because it as known to permit false latching.

The U.S. automakers have long been aware that the RCF-67/Type I side-release buckle poses a significant danger of false latching inherent in the buckle. They have not only failed to address the problem, but have suppressed it. And the problem of false latching is not an insignificant one.

During the period from 1967 through 1968, in Crash and Sled testing, Ford Engineer Peter Bertleson, Manager of Impact Dynamics at Ford, supervised approximately 500 crash tests involving test dummies, of which approximately 50 percent involved RCF-67/Type I side-release buckles. Of these tests, Ford knew at the time that approximately 15 percent of the dummies were left unrestrained at the conclusion of the test. Ford concluded that at least ½ of these resulted from Ford's own test technicians falsely latching the dummies into their buckles prior to initiation of the test.

Independent of false latching occurrences actually taking place during crash testing, Ford and G.M. had conducted a 1967 joint study which concluded that a new type of buckle incorporating a tongue eject feature was necessary to prevent false latching.

As early as the early 1970's Ford developed General Product Acceptance Specifications which mandated that a seat belt buckle "be designed so as to prevent false latching." Nonetheless, Ford continued to use the RCF-67 which Ford knew was susceptible to false latching.

In 1973 and 1974, Hammill, a Division of Firestone, began manufacturing a "diecast" buckle. The "diecast" buckle looked remarkably similar to the RCF-67, but was made by Hamill pursuant to a Swiss patent which announced as its sole purpose, prevention of the danger of "false latching." After two years of production and installation of the buckle into Ford vehicles, Ford and Hammill abandoned the buckle to conserve manufacturing costs on a more "difficult"buckle to produce. Ford reverted the false-latching prone RCF-67.

Just a few years later, a false latch was actually captured on videotape, once again during barrier crash testing being performed by Ford. In 1978, Ford performed a Crash Test Ford numbered 3888, a barrier impact test the purpose of which was to determine fuel system integrity. The buckle used for the dummies in the test was an RCF-67/Type buckle. The videotape clearly showed that at the time of impact, the crash test dummy occupying the front left passenger seat suddenly came unrestrained as its seat belt came flying off. The dummy proceeded into and shattered the vehicle's windshield. A human being in its place would have been killed instantly.

Ford's employees and experts in previous lawsuits have since admitted that Ford's own specially-trained engineers themselves once again "falsely latched" the right front seat passenger into the right seat of the pick-up truck used for Crash Test 3888. In fact, the principal Engineer on Crash Test 3888 himself admitted in a deposition that the dummy had been buckled into the vehicle in a prep garage one-half mile from the test building, hoisted onto a tow truck, towed over poorly paved ground with potholes and cracks, jacked down from the truck and placed onto the test track and then accelerated into the barrier, and at no time prior to the initial impact did the falsely-latched buckle ever unlatch.

In spite of these developments, Ford did not begin phasing out the RCF-67 until the mid 1990's, except for a few new car lines developed in the mid to late 1980's, which were designed to be equipped from the start with specially-designed side-release buckles possessing tongue eject features. These included the Ford Probe, Taurus and Mercury Sable.

At the same time, Ford and GM were aware that an increasing number of inadvertent unlatching customer complaints and lawsuits were being filed arising from accidents involving RCF-67 buckles.Ford's response to these incidents was essentially to conceal them from the public altogether, while secretly replacing RCF-67 buckles with the new end-release buckles now being supplied to Ford by bucklemakers TRW VSSI and Allied Signal.

>> NEXT: Inertial Unlatching

"WHEN RESULTS COUNT"
Bisnar | Chase

HOLDING WRONGDOERS ACCOUNTABLE FOR THE DAMAGES THEY CAUSE SINCE 1978

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